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Abstract 
This paper presents, in brief, the fundamentals of optimal control theory together with some 
notes for differential games, which is the game theoretic analogue of the optimal control. As it 
is recommended by literature references the main tool of analysis in open loop information 
structure for environmental models is the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle, while the 
Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation is the tool of analysis for any closed loop informational 
structure. As applications of the above theoretic considerations we present some 
environmental economic models which are solved both as optimal control problems and as 
differential games as well. 
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1. The history of the Optimal Control Theory 
Optimal control is one of many strands of control theory which uses mathematical 
methods to address a wide area of applications in many scientific fields. The mathematics of 
optimal control theory is the generalization of the ancient theory called "calculus of 
variations". The early applications in calculus of variations were in physics, since 1662 
Fermat derived “the law of refraction” as a solution to a minimum time problem. Only after 
more than 250 years, in 1924, Evans studied a dynamic economic model for monopolists, 
whereas Ramsey (1928), using techniques of calculus of variations, solved the famous capital 
accumulation model (the well known Ramsey model). The first environmental model 
analyzed with the calculus of variations was the optimal exploitation of exhaustible resources, 
first proposed by Hotelling (1931). To begin with optimal control theory it is better to set the 
statement of a calculus of variations problem and then to compare with the same optimal 
control problem statement and solution. 
The fundamental calculus of variations problem appears as an optimization problem 
of the form:  
                 
[ ] ( ) ( )
( )
( )
0
maximize    or   minimize   
 subject to                          = A    (A given)
 and                                    = Z    (T, Z given)            
T  
 =  
 
∫
dx t
V x F t,x t , dt
dt
x 0
x T
                        
( )1  
The task of the calculus of variations is to select from a set of admissible x  paths the one that 
yields an extreme value of the integral [ ]V x  . Note that the solution path is restricted to 
those curves that are continuous with continuous derivatives. 
For the solution process of problem ( )1  one has to deal with the basic first order 
condition, also called the Euler equation, which briefly says that every small perturbation 
( )ε⋅p t of the optimal time path ( )*x t , i.e. ( ) ( ) ( )ε⋅*x t = x t + p t , has no action on the 
integral [ ]V x , as this perturbation tends to zero, or formally  
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0
0
ε=
=
ε
dV
d                                                        
( )2   
so the condition 0ε =dV d  is a necessary condition for the extremal.  
Since ( )2  is not operating, as many arbitrary variables are involved, the final form of 
the Euler equation, after the appropriate development, becomes:  
                                    0′ =x x
d
F F
dt
-     for all [ ]t 0,T∈                 ( )3  
and the more explicit version of the Euler equation, after ( )3 ’s expansion, is the following 
second order nonlinear differential equation 
              ( ) ( ) 0′ ′ ′ ′′′ ′+ + − =xx x xx txF x t F x t F F   for all [ ]t 0,T∈              ( )4  
That is ( )4  is a more familiar, since the only calculations needed are the derivatives of the 
objective functional F with respect to ′ ′ ′ ′x x ,  xx ,  tx and x . 
Suppose you need to find the extremal of the functional [ ] ( )
2
0
′= ∫
2
V x 12tx+x dt  
with boundary conditions ( )0 0=x  and ( )2 8=x . Since ′
2
F=12tx+x , following ( )4  
we compute  xF =12t , ′ ′xF =2x , ′ ′x xF =2  and ′ ′xx txF =F = 0 . The Euler equation and 
its solution is the following: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )′′ ′′ ′⇔ ⇔ ⇔2 * 31 1 22x t 12t= 0      x t = 6t      x t = 3t +c       x t = t +c t+c-  
The values of the constants of integration are 2 1c = c = 0 , setting in the solution t= 0  and 
t=2  and substituting into the boundary conditions. So the extremal, the optimal time path, 
is the cubic time function ( )* 3x t = t . 
A special class of the isoperimetric problems arising in the case the constraint is 
substituted by an integral of the type: ( )
0
T
′ =∫ G t,x,x dt k with k  a constant. In such a 
situation the problem appears in general (with m integral constraints) as 
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( )
( )
( )
maximize     
 subject to   
.
.
.                      
                  and appropriat
′ ′′
′ ′′
′ ′′
∫
∫
∫
T
1 2 n 1 2 n
0
T
1 1 2 n 1 2 n 1
0
T
m 1 2 n 1 2 n m
0
F t,x ,x ,...,x ,x ,x ,..., x dt
G t,x ,x ,...,x ,x ,x ,...,x dt= k
G t,x ,x ,...,x ,x ,x ,...,x dt= k
e boundary conditions
  
 
In this case the Euler equation becomes the following Euler–Lagrange equation (it is assumed 
only one integral constraint) 
                                        ( ) ( )x 0λ λ′ ′− − − =x x x
d
F G F G
dt
                   ( )5  
where λ  is the Lagrange multiplier which in the isoperimetric case is a constant.  
Moreover, in the one–state–variable problem with a single integral constraint, it can 
be shown that the modified Lagrange integrand ( ) ( )λ′ ′= −L F t,x,x G t,x,x  can be used 
and then apply the Euler – Lagrange equation to x  alone. Now the value of the (constant) λ  
can be determined from the isoperimetric constraint. 
In the above class of the isoperimetric problems belongs the model proposed by H. 
Hotelling in the classic article “The Economics of Exhaustible Resources” (Hotelling, 1931). 
The major conclusion of the Hotelling model is that the pure competition can yield a socially 
optimal extraction path for an exhaustible resource, while the monopoly cannot. The resulting 
condition, after the solution
1
 of the isoperimetric problem, which ensures the above 
conclusion, is the following 
                                   ( ) ( ) ρλ′− = tP Q C Q e
              
( )6  
                                                          
1
 For a detailed analysis of the solution process, see among others Chiang (1982). 
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which in turn says that, in the pure competition, the quantity ( ) ( )′−P Q C Q  grows at the 
interest rate ρ . Note that the Lagrange multiplier λ  in ( )6  represents the initial value of the 
difference price minus marginal cost ( ( ) ( )′−P Q C Q ).  
In the monopoly the final solution leads to the conclusion “the difference between the 
marginal revenue and the marginal cost grows at the interest rate”, i.e. 
( ) ( ) ρλ′ ′− = tR Q C Q e , which is suboptimal compared with the socially optimal extraction. 
After the Pontryagin's et al. (1962) book "Mathematical Theory of Optimal Processes", the 
Maximum Principle became the main tool of analysis in economics and management, 
physics, biology and so on. The absolute success of the Maximum Principle is due to the 
introduction of the two, instead of one, types of variables in the optimization process. The 
first is the control and the other is the state variable. The control variable is a steering 
mechanism which one can maneuver so that as to drive the state variable to various positions 
at any time via one or more equations of motion. That is, the Maximum Principle is this tool 
which sets an order in the mess of the corner solutions that may appear in the optimization 
process. Here the goal of the optimal control theory, is the determination of the optimal time 
path of the control variable first and then the determination of the state variable, unlike the 
calculus of variations where the main task is to find the optimal time path of the state 
variable. 
Especially the simplest optimal control problem can be derived from the calculus of 
variations problem if the time derivative of the state variable, involved in the objective 
functional, is replaced by the so called equation of motion. Below we present a simple 
calculus problem together with the equivalent optimal control problem. The calculus problem 
is:  
                 
( )
( )
( )
0
maximize                           
 subject to                          = A    (A given)
 and                                    free   (T given)            
T
= ∫ ɺV F t,x,x dt
x 0
x T
                          
( )7a
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Now introducing the control variable u  and the equation of motion ɺx = u  the same problem 
in optimal control fashion can be written as:  
            
( )
( ) ( )
0
maximize                           
 subject to                          x = u
 and                                    = A,   free   (A, T given)            
T
= ∫
ɺ
V F t,x,u dt
x 0 x T
      
( )7b
 
and the fundamental link between the two variables became apparent. 
It is important to say that at the solution process, according to the Maximum 
Principle, except the time, state and control variables one more class of variable(s) will 
emerge. This is the so called costate variable, measuring the shadow price of the state 
variable, denoted by λ(t). 
Except the maximum principle there is another solution method for optimal control 
problems which is called the "dynamic programming". Starting with a wider class of similar 
problems which can be solved, the original problem is embodied in the larger class of 
problems. A policy oriented expression for the principle of optimality could be the following: 
“An optimal policy has the property that whatever the initial state and initial decision are, the 
remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy with regard to the state resulting from 
the first decision”. Now, it remains to set as simple as possible in rigorous mathematics the 
maximum principle and principle of optimality.  
2. The formulation of the problem and the solution process 
We discuss the class of optimal control problems that appears in the modeling of 
dynamic systems. Then, the state of a system at time t  can be described by the following n–
dimensional column vector 
                   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) [ ]    ,    0,Tn′ ∈ ∈ℝ1 2 nx t = x t ,x t ,...,x t t  
where the terminal time T 0>  in many economic applications is infinity, i.e. T = ∞ . 
Moreover suppose that there is a decision maker influencing the time path of the state variable 
by choosing the time path of the m–dimensional control value. That is  
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                      ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) [ ]       ,     0,′= ∈ Ω ∈1 2 mu t u t ,u t ,...,u t x t , t t T  
The control variable ( )  u t  is a piecewise continuous function and ( )( )Ω x t ,t  is the given 
control region, i.e. ( ) ( )( )  ∈ Ωu t   x t , t . Additionally it is assumed that the dynamis of the 
state variable is governed by the following Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE) 
                          ( ) ( ) ( )( ) [ ]     0,f ∈ɺx t = x t ,u t , t t T                      ( )8a  
                          subject to ( ) 0x 0 = x                                                  ( )8b  
with terminal constraints: 
                             
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
′
′ ′′≥
′′
T
i i
T
i i
i
x T = x ,      i =1,...,n                8c
x T x ,      i = n +1,...,n          8d
x T  free,       i = n +1,...,n          8e
 
where 
n m n,   :f′ ′′ ′ ′′ ≤ × × →ℝ ℝ ℝ ℝn >0,   n >0,   n +n n  is a vector valued 
function ( )1 2, ,..., nf f f f ′= , where for all ( ),    fii =1,...,n x,u,t  and ( )f∂ ∂i x,u,t x  are 
continuous functions with respect to their arguments. Equation ( )8a  is the system dynamics 
or the equation of motion. 
Now we suppose that the decision maker has a time discounted objective in the form 
of the following functional 
           ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
0
  ρ ρ−= +∫
T
t TV u . e g x t ,u t , t dt  e S x T ,T-                ( )9  
( ) ( )( )g x t ,u t , t  is the instantaneous profit gained by exerting the control variable ( )u t at 
time t , ( )x t  is the current state, while ρ  is the positive discount rate. At the end horizon 
T the state would be ( )x T , while the corresponding payoff  is described by the term  
( )( )S x T ,T  also called, in the optimal control language, the salvage or scrap value. The 
payoff function ( ) ( )( )g x t ,u t , t  and its partial derivative ( )∂ ∂g x,u,t x  are assumed 
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continuous with respect to their arguments as well as the scrap value function 
n:S × →ℝ ℝ ℝ  with respect to x  and T. Then the task of the regulator is to choose the best 
policy ( )u .  among all the admissible trajectories. As a consequence the optimal control 
problem is the maximization of  the reward ( )( )V u .  taking into account that the state’s 
motion is governed by equation ( )8a . 
As it is mentioned above, generally there exists two different approaches to solve an 
optimal control problem of the type ( ) ( )8     9− . One is based on the Pontryagin’s Maximum 
Principle (Pontryagin et al., 1962; Grass et al., 2008), while the other hinges upon the 
Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation introduced by Bellman (1957). 
The Maximum Principle 
Before we proceed with the necessary first order conditions of the maximization with 
the Maximum Principle approach, it is important to introduce the Hamiltonian function (H), 
which has as arguments all the involved variables λt,  x,  u,  . The Hamiltonian function is 
defined as 
                             ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )    fλ λ= +H t,x,u, g t,x,u t t,x,u             ( )10
 
Once the Hamiltonian function is defined by ( )10  there is the requirement to maximized with 
respect to the control variable u  at every point of time. Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle 
states as:  
Theorem 1 (Pontryagin et al., 1962; Grass et al, 2008).  
Let ( ) ( )* *x . ,  u .   be an optimal solution of the problem ( ) ( )8     9−
 
 with free terminal state. 
Then there exists a continuous and piecewise continuously differentiable function ( ).λ  with  
( ) nλ ∈ℝt  satisfying for all [ ]0,∈t T   
             ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )* * *
,
, , , max ,λ λ
∈Ω
=
*u x t t
H x t u t t t H x t u t , t , t             
and at every point of time t  where ( )u .  is continuous  
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                         ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )* *, , ,λ ρλ λ= −ɺ xt t H x t u t t t                     ( )10a  
Furthermore the transversality condition  
                         ( ) ( )( )*λ = xT S x T ,T                                               ( )10b  
holds, where the Hamiltonian function is defined as (10).  
Next in the lines of Forster (1980) we provide an example of a pollution abatement 
model solved as an optimal control problem. 
Example 1 
A question raised in Environmental Economics is how much of a given level of 
emissions should be abated (with a given abatement technology) and how much should be 
diffused in the environment. To focus on this problem let us assume that ( )P t  represents the 
pollutants flows generated by the firms’ production process and ( )E P  are the emissions 
produced by these pollutants flows. These emissions can either be abated or diffused in the 
environment. Let A  be the amount of emissions allocated for abatement, so 
( )D=E P A- is the corresponding diffusion rate or net emissions dispersed in the 
environment. The stock of pollutants is raised according to the equation  
                        ( ) ( ) 00δ δ =ɺP=D P=E P A P,      P P- - -  
where δ  is natural decay rate. 
Furthermore let ( )U A  be the utility which the society enjoys from the abatement at 
rate A  and ρ  is the discount factor of the society. Then the regulator has to solve the 
following optimal control problem 
          
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
t T
           A .
0
0
         max            (11 )
                   (11 )  
0                                    (11 )              
S a
b
c
ρ ρ
δ
Τ
− −
   +    
=
∫
ɺ
e U A dt e P T
subject to P=E P A P
              P P
- -
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where S  is the salvage function mentioned above. 
The necessary assumptions on the functions U and E are the following: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
0,    ,  0    0            
0,     0      0                               
0,      ,                                    
0       
ρ δ δ
′ ′ ′′> =∞ < ≥
′ ′′> <
′ ′= > + ∞ <
′′ ≤
U A U 0 U A for  all A 12a
E P E P for  all P> 12b
E 0 E 0 E 12c
S P ( )                                                                         12d
 
The properties summarized in (12) are the well known Inada conditions. For the solution of 
the optimal control problem (11), first we formulate the Hamiltonian function 
                           ( ) ( )( )λ δ− −H=U A + E P P A                            ( )13  
The Hamiltonian function is concave with respect to A  due to the assumptions (12), i.e. 
′′=AAH U <0 . Thus the maximizer 
*A of the Hamiltonian ( )λH P,A,  for fixed P  and 
λ lies in the interior of [ )0,Ω= ∞  and satisfies the following first order condition 
                                ( ) ( )* * 0λ λ′= − =AH P,A , U A  
from which the Maximum Principle yields 
                                                 ( )*λ ′=U A                                       ( )14  
Due to the concavity of the utility function U , the inverse function ( ) 1−′U  exists and 
therefore 
*A  is a function of the adjoint variable λ  given by 
                                        ( ) ( ) ( )1* Uλ λ−′=A                                ( )15  
The Hamiltonian's concavity in ( )P,A is assured. This is easily seen, by using the positivity 
of λ , which can be deduced from (14) and (12a), which in turn implies the negative 
definiteness of the matrix 
                                 
( ) 0
0
λ   ′′   =     ′′   
PP PA
AP AA
H H E P
H H U
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and therefore the concavity of the Hamiltonian. Moreover the hypothesis that any solution 
that satisfies the necessary conditions is optimal is ensured (applying the maximum principle), 
due to the concavity of the salvage function. 
Next we derive the equation of motion for the costate variable by applying (10b). For the 
Hamiltonian (13), (10b) yields 
              ( )( ) ( )( )λ ρλ ρλ λ δ ρ δ λ′ ′= − = + − = + −ɺ PH E P E P                   ( )16       
Substituting (15) into the state equation (11b) establishes  
                            ( ) ( ) ( )1  U λ δ−′ɺP=E P P- -                                    ( )17    
Equations (16) an (17) is the so called canonical system of equations which is appropriate for 
further analysis. 
Since the control function given by (15) is differentiable with respect to time, the time 
derivative of the ( ) 0λ =AH P,A,  is: 
                                     ( )d
d
λ′′= −ɺ ɺAH U A A
t
 
and using the adjoint equation (16) and equation (14), the time derivative of the control A can 
be written as: 
                            
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
δ ρ
′ ′
+ −
′′ ′′
ɺ
U A E P
A=
U A U A
        ( )17a  
Equation (17a) together with the state dynamics ( ) δɺP=E P A P- -  constitute the 
transformed state–control system. 
The infinite horizon version of the Maximum Principle was first introduced by Halkin 
(1974) as: 
Theorem 2 (Maximum Principle for an Infinite Time Horizon) 
Let the pair ( ) ( )( )* *x . ,  u .  be an optimal solution of the infinite horizon problem analogue 
to (8)-(9) problem. Then there exists a continuous and piecewise continuously differentiable 
function ( ).λ  with  ( ) nλ ∈ℝt  and a constant 0 0λ > satisfying for all [ ]0,∈t T   
12 
 
                           
( )( )0 ,  0λ λ ≠t              
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )* * *
,
, , , max ,λ λ
∈Ω
=
*u x t t
H x t u t t t H x t u t , t , t             
and at every point of time t  where ( )u .  is continuous  
                       ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )* * 0, , ,λ ρλ λ λ= −ɺ xt t H x t u t t , t             
Note that there is no transversality condition in the sense of (10b), a result that is a 
consequence of the proof strategy presented in Halkin (1974). 
Continuing with the pollution abatement model in infinite horizon, the basic 
equations are transformed below as                             
                         
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
t
           A .
0
0
         max                                     
                            
0                                         
ρ
δ
∞
−
       
=
∫
ɺ
e U A dt 18a
subject to P=E P A P 18b
              P P
- -
( )
( ) ( )
( )
         
                    0                                     
                                                                     
≤ ≤
′≥
18c
A E P 18d
P P 18e
 
and the canonical system 
                                       
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )( ) ( )
                                    
                   
δ
δ ρ
′
′+ −
′′
ɺ
ɺ
P=E P A P 19a
U A
A= E P 19b
U A
- -
                                
Next we draw the phase portrait for the canonical system of equations (19a)-(19b). Therefore 
we consider the ɺɺP,  A , isoclines, yielding 
                                              ( ) δ=A E P P-                         ( )20a                                    
                                               ( ) δ ρ′ = +E P                         ( )20b     
Under the assumptions (12b), (12c), the ɺP  isocline (20a) reduces to a strictly concave 
function. This concave function vanishes at the origin and for some 0>ɶP , but meets its 
maximum at some 0< ɶmP <P . The other isocline ɺA  becomes a vertical line. The condition 
13 
 
(12c) together with (20b) now assures the existence of a unique ɺP  satisfying (20b). Finally 
we find a unique equilibrium at ( )ɶɶP,A  with ( ) δɶ ɶ ɶA=E P P-  for which  the corresponding 
Jacobian is the following matrix: 
                                  ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
ˆ
0
δ ′ − −     = ′   ′′−   ′′   
ɶ
ɶɶ ɶ
ɶ
ɶ
E P
J P,A U A
E P
U A
  
Since ˆdet   J<0  there exists a saddle point equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium exhibits a stable 
path. Therefore, for initial values in a neighborhood of P  the stable path is a possible 
candidate for an optimal solution.  
Further phase portrait analysis includes the following two cases. 
Case 1: Under the constraint (18d) there exist points 1 2<ɶ ɶP P , with the property: for initial 
values between these points the resulting path is the unique optimal solution (see Figure 1). 
The exit point 1
ɶP  is an intersection point of the state path with the axis A= 0 , but the  point  
2
ɶP lies into the intersection of the stable path with the curve ( )=A E P . 
Case 2: With the constraint (18e) the solution for  1′<ɶ ɶP P <P  is depicted in Figure 1.b. In 
this case it is optimal to control the system into the marginal equilibrium point ( )′ ′P ,A . For 
initial values of the state into the open interval between  1′ ɶP   and  P , the optimality of the 
above solution can be explicitly shown. Since  ( ) 0λ ≥t for all  t  and ( )
t
lim
→∞
≥ ɶP t P ,  the 
limiting transversality condition is satisfied for any admissible orbit of the state. Finally, we 
conclude that the depicted solution in Figure 1.b is the unique optimal solution, because the 
adjoint and the control variables are both continuous at the point  1
ɶP . 
Note that Figures 1.a and 1.b are drawn for the functional forms ( )=E P P    and   
( ) log=U A A and the parameter values are δ=0.5 and ρ=0.1.    
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        A  
                       ɺA= 0  
                                                   ( )A=E P  
 
 
 
 
 
       ɶA                                  ɺP= 0     
 
        0   1
ɶP   ɶP           2
ɶP                                                             P  
 
Figure 1.a. The black dotted curve is the optimal solution path for the pollution abatement 
model. Starting between the states 1
ɶP  and 2
ɶP  the path which converges to the saddle point 
( ),ɶ ɶA P is the optimal solution. For all other initial values except the previously noted the 
control trajectory under consideration is on its boundary until the exit point 1
ɶP  or 2
ɶP  is met. 
     
      A  
 
                                                        ( )A=E P  
 
 
 
 
 
     ′A                                                  ɺP= 0  
 
 
        0                ′P    1ɶP                                                              P       
 
Figure 1.b. Here we consider  ′≥P P , i.e., for state values into the interval  between ′P and    
1
ɶP , the optimal control line lies in the interior of the control region and the optimal path leads 
to the boundary equilibrium ( ),′ ′A P . For states 1≥ ɶP P  the control values are chosen from 
the upper boundary of the control region, until the exit point  1
ɶP  is reached.              
15 
 
The Principle of Optimality 
As it is mentioned above the other approach to solve optimal control problems is the 
principle of Optimality and is based on the HJB equation. According to that principle, the 
wider class of these problems, in which an optimal control problem belongs, is sated as 
follows: 
                          
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
t
max   +∫
T
u .
g x s ,u s ,s ds  S x T ,T
 
                            (21a)   
                  Subject to            ( ) ( ) ( )( ) [ ]     ,f ∈ɺx s = x s ,u s ,s s t T                           
(21b)
 
                            ( ) ξ=x t  
As it is assumed above the optimal control problem under consideration has an optimal 
solution for any pair ( ),ξ t  . The Bellman equation with the pair ( ),ξ t , ( ),ξV t  as arguments, 
is defined as 
                    ( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
.
, max   ξ = +∫
T
u
t
V t g x s ,u s ,s ds  S x T ,T       
        (22)
 
Now in order to produce the HJB equation the following Principle of Optimality must be 
used. 
Theorem 3 (Principle of Optimality)  
We suppose that there exists a solution ( ) ( )( )* *x . ,u . of the problem (21) and this solution 
exists for each pair ( ),ξ t  with [ ], ,   nξ∈ ∈ℝt 0 T . Then  ( ) ( )( )* *x . ,u .  is an optimal 
solution for the problem of class (21) with ( ) ξ=x t  if and only if 
            ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )* * *,   ξ = τ τ τ τ +∫
s
t
V t g x ,u , d   V x s ,s                        (23a)  
and       ( )( ) ( )( )* *=V x T ,T S x T ,T                                        (23b)  
 Note that, the information which records the relative change of  ( )ξW ,t  with respect to   ξ,  
when s  tends to  t  is given by relation (23a). The resulting HJB equation formally is defined 
as follows. 
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Theorem 4 (HJB equation).  
Let there exist an admissible control ( )*u . and their corresponding trajectory ( )*x .
 
for the 
state. Moreover the Bellman function ( ),ξV t  is continuously differentiable with respect to 
ξ and t . Then ( ) ( )( )* *x . ,u .  is an optimal solution of the problem (21) if and only if the 
Bellman function ( ),ξV t  satisfies the HJB equation: 
                        ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }, max ,   , ,
u
fξ ξ ξ ξ= +- t xV t g u,t  V t u,t                 (24a)                  
and    ( ) ( )ξ ξ=V ,T S ,T                                                               (24b)  
 for all   ( ) [ ], 0,nξ ∈ ×ℝt T   for which ( )*u .  is continuous.                              
Note that for the problems which the discount factor is entered into the objective 
functional, equation (24a) is not operative in the solution process. Therefore another 
condition, for the HJB equation provided by Dockner et al (2000), satisfies the following 
partial differential equation: 
             ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }, , max ,   , ,
u
fρ = +- t xV x t V x t g x u,t  V x t x u,t                      (25)  
and (25) is the HJB function for discounted problems, which is very useful for our economic 
problems under consideration. 
Next we present an example of a very simple environmental model for which the HJB 
equation is used in order to extract feedback strategies and the optimal value function. 
Example 2 
Assume we have a nonrenewable resource extraction monopolistic firm that sells the 
extracted product at a fixed price 0>p . We denote by ( )u t  the resource’s extraction rate 
and we suppose that this rate equals to the sales rate, thus preventing the resource’s stock up. 
Moreover we denote by ( )x t  the remainder resource stock at time t . The system dynamics 
is described as “the rate of reduction of the resource stock equals to the extraction rate”. Thus 
the equation of motion is the following: 
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                                          ( ) ( )= −ɺx t u t                                          (26)                    
and with boundary conditions    ( ) ( )0,    0≥ >x t u t   
Extraction cost is an increasing function with respect to the extraction rate ( )u t  and 
decreasing with respect to the remainder stock  ( )x t . 
The monopolistic firm maximizes its discounted profits, given by the objective 
functional: 
                    ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
0
ρ
∞
−  =   ∫
tJ u . e pu t c u t ,x t dt-                         (27)         
And the optimal control problem is: 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
0
ρ
∞
−  =   ∫
tmax  J u . e pu t c u t ,x t dt-                     (28)  
Subject to     ( ) ( )= −ɺx t u t   
With the boundary conditions    ( ) ( )0,    0≥ >x t u t  
Specifying the cost function as: 
                                   ( ) γ=
2u
c u,x
2x
                                               (29)  
we have the following result. 
 
Proposition 1  
“An optimal feedback extraction strategy ( )u x,t  of the problem (28) under the constraint 
(26) is the following: 
                                   ( )( )
( )
γ
 − =
x p A t
u x t ,t   
where ( )A t  is the unique solution of the following Riccati differential equation: 
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       ( ) ( )
( )
2
ρ
γ
 − = −ɺ
p A t
A t A t
2
” 
2
           
Proof 
The HJB equation of the above problem is: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }max |fρ − = + ∈t x
u
V x,t V x,t g x,u, t V x,t x,u,t u U x,t  
    with ( ) ( ) γ= −
2u
g x,u,t pu t
2x
 ,  ( ) ( )f =−x,u,t u t                                               
Taking the first order conditions of the above HJB function we have: 
( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
0 0    
0                                                    
f
γ
γ
γ
   ∂ − − ∂    = ⇒ = ⇒
∂ ∂
⇒ − − = ⇒ =
2
x
x
x
x
u
pu V x,t u
g x,u,t +V x,t x,u,t 2x
u u
x p V x,tu
p V x,t u x,t 30
x
-
Making use of the well informed guess for the value function 
                           ( ) ( )V x,t =A t x  
thus giving the following derivatives: 
                              
( ) ( )
( ) ( )ɺ
x
t
V x,t =A t
V x,t =A t x
 
Now substituting the value function derivative (with respect to state) into the strategy (30) we 
have the final strategy 
                                 ( )( )
( )
γ
 − =
x p A t
u x t ,t  
Now it remains to verify that this strategy satisfies the initial HJB equation for the conjectured 
linear value function  ( ) ( )V x,t =A t x . 
First, substituting the strategy into the right hand side of the HJB equation gives: 
                                                          
2
 The solution of the differential equation ( ) ( )
( )( )2
2
p A t
A t A tρ
γ
−
= −ɺ  is  
( )
( )2 1 2 22tanh 2
2
p t C
A t p r p
γ ρ γρ
γρ γ γρ
γ
 + +  = + + +   
 , where tanh( )
x x
x x
e e
x
e e
−
−
−
=
+
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( )( )
( )( )
( )
( )( )2
RHS(HJB)
γ
γ
γ γ
 
  
   −   = − + − =   
      
22x p A t
x p A t x p A t
p A t
2x
-
-
  
          
( )( )
2γ
=
2
p A t
x
-
  
Second, the left hand side of the same equation becomes: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )LHS HJB ρ =  
ɺ
trV x,t V x,t = x A t A t- -  
Equating both sides, i.e. ( )LHS HJB RHS(HJB)=  the result is the differential equation 
                                  ( ) ( )
( )
2
ρ
γ
 − = −ɺ
p A t
A t A t
2
  
for which the solution must be ( )A t  in order to satisfy the HJB equation.         
 
3. Differential Games 
Game theory is intended to be a useful tool for modeling situations in which there are 
many (rational) decision makers and for guessing the outcome of decision makers' 
competition or cooperation. Here we deal only with differential games. Differential games 
involved in dynamic conflict situations, for which an arbitrary number of decision makers 
(such as renewable or nonrenewable resources extractors, pollution regulators etc) interact in 
an environment e.g., a fishery place, a mine, a factory or a society) .  
In fact, differential games are those dynamic games for which the maximization of 
each player's objective is subject to some limitations. All those constraints which are subject 
to the payoffs of each player are included in one or more differential equations describing the 
state's evolution of the game. 
Since every player involved in a differential game has its own objective functional to 
maximize (or minimize), optimal control theoretic methods can be used. Considering the 
game’s solution, we seek for the Nash equilibrium which is the appropriate, but not the only, 
concept of solution. Under the Nash equilibrium concept there no incentive for none of the 
involved players to deviate from his/her own Nash equilibrium strategy. 
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Before we continue with the (brief) description of the solution it is necessary to give 
some definitions of the type of the available strategies depending on information patterns. An 
open loop strategy is only a time dependent rule of decision, i.e., the resulting controls are 
functions of time as: 
                                              ( ) ( )iφ=iu t t  
An open loop strategy is used only if the players commit at the start of the game to follow a 
fixed time path. This strategy is applied only if it is impossible for every one player to 
observe the current state variable involved. 
A closed loop of feedback or Markovian strategy is that for which each player observes the 
system’s current state i.e., according to the state – time pair ( )x,t  and decides about her 
action according to the rule: 
                                   ( ) ( )( )φi iu t = x t ,t                                          
while the stationary closed loop strategy is defined independently of the time as: 
                                       ( ) ( )( )φi iu t = x t  
The major question raised in differential games is how we can compute the Nash equilibrium. 
Supposing that all the other N–1 rivals of player i  use closed loop strategies  
( ) ( )( ), ,   φ ≠j ju t = x t t j i  , then player  i  has to solve an optimal control type problem, 
which is of the following form: 
                    
( )
( )( ) ( )( )
.
0
max ,   
ρ ρφ −
∈Ω
+∫ i i
i i
T
t T
i i i i
u
e g x,u , x t ,t dt  e S x T-  
subject to   ( )( ) ( ) 0, ,      0f φ =ɺ i ix = x,u x t ,t, x x-  
where   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , , , ,..., , , , ,..., ,φ φ φ φ φ φ=
- -i 1 2 i 1 i+1 Nx t x t x t x t x t x t          
Since one differential game is faced as N optimal control games the above theorems 2 and 4 
for the Maximum Principle and for the Principle of Optimality are in use.  
Next we present an example of a differential game model. 
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Example 3 
As a differential game example we deal with the basic renewable resource 
model, but we modify its growth function to be a Gompertz type. The Gompertz 
growth function is given by the expression (see for instance Schafer, 1967) 
    ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 = −  g x x t ln x t  
Concerning the properties of the Gompertz growth this function first of all fulfills the 
conditions:  
( ) ( )ln′ =−g x x         ( ) 0′′ =− <1g x
x
     ( )0 0=g        
Second, it is a concave function and therefore it has "the pure compensation property" 
as it is defined by Clark (1984). 
Third, it is right–skewed and has the same properties as the logistic growth function, 
while the upper stationary solution of ( )ɺx = g x , i.e. the solution x = e , is 
asymptotically stable. 
 
    ( )g x  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
              0                      1                                              e                         x  
Figure 2: The shape of the Gompertz growth function ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 lng x x t x t = −    
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According to that growth function the stock of the resource obeys to the 
following differential equation law of motion: 
        ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 21 φ φ − − −  ɺx t = x t ln x t  
where ,   iφ i =1,2  is the harvesting function for the two players of the model. If we 
define the fishing effort for the i  player as ( ) ( ) ( )a tφ=i it x t , then the game is a 
non-cooperative one for which every agent chooses a time path of his own fishing 
effort ( )ai t  that maximizes the discounted utility. We transform the utility in the form 
of an additive separable function, i.e. dependent on the fish stock ( )x t  and on utility 
that every player enjoys from harvesting ( )tφi  as well.  
We specify the utility functions to be in logarithmic form arising from the 
following utility function specification often used in growth models 
     ( )
( )
( )
1
0,1
0
β
β
β
β
 − ∈= =
x
U x
ln x
  
for which the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is given by ( )1 1 β− . Moreover, 
we define ( ) ( )y t = lnx t  in the case 0β = .  
A number of calculations are performed in order to set up the problem. The 
calculations are the following:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )⇒ ⇒ ⇒ɺ ɺ ɺ ɺy t y t
dx t
y t = lnx t x t = e = x t = e y t x t = x t y t
dt
  
Now, the transformed evolution equation becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
1 2
1 2
φ φ
φ φ − − ⇒ − − ⇒  
ɺ
ɺ
x t
x t = x t 1 ln x t =1 ln x t
x t x t x t
- -  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 21 a t a t⇒ = − − −ɺy t y t   
23 
 
This is the transformed stock evolution equation that depends on the logarithm of the 
resource stock as well as on the players’ fishing effort. 
The utility function that is maximized is depending on the resource stock and 
on effort as well. It is assumed that original present value maximized utility is 
dependent on the harvesting function, i.e.: ( )( )
0
max lntρ φ
∞
−∫ ie t dt , but the latter can 
be transformed as follows: 
           
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
0 0
0 0
max ln max ln ln ln
max ln ln max ln
ia
t t
t
a t
ρ ρ
φ φ
ρ ρ
φ
φ φ
φ
∞ ∞
− −
∞ ∞
− −
 = − +  
     =  + = +        
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
i i
i
t t
i i
it t
i
e dt e x t x t dt
e x t dt e y t dt
x t
 
The differential game now becomes:  
                            ( )( ) ( )
0
max lnt
a
a tρ
∞
−  +  ∫
i
ie y t dt
                      
( )31  
subject to           ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 a a= − − −ɺ 1 2y t y t t t              ( )32  
In what follows we explore the Nash equilibria of the game which may be a time 
consistent one in the sense of subgame perfectness.  
Time consistency could be seen as a minimal requirement for the credibility of 
an equilibrium strategy. If player i (i=1,2) had an incentive to deviate from his 
strategy iψ  during the time interval [ )0,T , the other player j,   j=1,2  would not 
believe his announcement of  iψ  in the first place. Consequently, player j computes 
his own strategy taking into account the expected future deviation of player i  which, 
in general, would lead to strategies different from ,   ψ ≠j j i . Open-loop informational 
structure strategies are not in general time consistent; while closed-loop or Markovian 
strategies are certainly time consistent (Dockner et al., 2000).  
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On the other hand subgame perfectness is the concept for which an 
equilibrium strategy remains unchanged regardless the starting period the game 
begins. So, subgame perfectness is a sole requirement for the credibility of an 
equilibrium strategy that is time consistency for that strategy. We conclude if we can 
found an equilibrium strategy for the game, independently of the initial state and 
regardless of the informational structure employed, this strategy has the subgame 
perfectness property and can be a time consistent strategy. 
Equilibrium analysis 
Proposition 2 
The game with the Gompertz as the resource growth function, admits an equilibrium 
strategy of the form 1a ρ= +i  , which is time consistent. 
Proof 
The Hamiltonian of the above problem for the player i (i=1,2) is  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ln a t a aλ  = + + − − − i i 1 2H y t t 1 y t t t  
and the conditions for an interior solution are 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
1 1
0 a
a a
λ
λ
∂
= − = ⇒ =
∂
i
i
i i
H
t t
t t
  
The costate’s variable equation of motion becomes:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1
y
λ ρλ λ ρ λ
∂
=− + ⇒ =− + +
∂
ɺ ɺiHt t t t   
with solution     ( ) ( )11
1
e
ρ
λ
ρ
+= + Ω
+
t
t  
along with the transversality condition  ( ) ( )lim 0λ
→∞
=
t
t y t ,  
which must be satisfied, so it is reasonable to set 0Ω=  and the costate variable 
becomes ( ) 1
1
λ
ρ
=
+
t . Substituting the value of the costate variable into the strategy, 
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the resulting strategy becomes 1a ρ= +i  which is independent of the initial state, and 
therefore it is time consistent. 
Proposition 3 
In the case the players cooperate the joint cooperative time consistent equilibrium 
harvesting strategy is given by the expression ( ) 1
2
a
ρ+
=t . 
Proof 
The evolution equation in the cooperative case becomes 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2a= − −ɺy t y t t  where ( ) ( ) ( )1 2a a a= +t t t  is the joint fishing effort of the 
two players. The Hamiltonian for the cooperative case is,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ln 1 2a aλ  = + + − − cH y t t t y t t  
 and the rest of algebraic manipulations for maximization reveals the cooperative 
equilibrium strategy 
1
2
a
ρ+
=  which is again time consistent.  
The payoff (Value) function 
Proposition 4 
In the case the players do not cooperate the payoff function for each player is 
( )1 1ln 1
1 1
ρ
ρ ρ ρ
 
 = + + + − + + 
i
y
V 2 . 
Proof 
We check whether the equilibrium strategies given by proposition 2 are verified by 
the above value function. The Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) of the differential 
game (31)-(32) becomes:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )max ln 1    a a aρ
 ∂   = + + − − − ≠   ∂  
i
i i i j
V
V y t t y t t t i j,  i =1,2  j=1,2
y
 
and the maximization of the RHS of the HJB equation yields: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
ln 1
1
0
i i j
i i
a a a t
a a
 ∂   ∂ + + − − −   ∂ ∂  = ⇒ =
∂ ∂
i
i
V
y t t y t t t
y V
y t
      .  
Differentiation of the proposition’s 4 value function with respect to the state 
variabley , yields 
1
1 ρ
∂
=
∂ +
iV
y
 . Now equating the derivatives  
∂
∂
iV
y
, the final result is 
1.a ρ= +i  
Main Points 
In this paper we first discus the dynamical methods as they applied in environmental 
and resource economics, given in a rigorous mathematical language; and second, as a 
contribution, we introduce and solve two environmental and resource models. The first model 
is an optimal control one, touching the classical monopolistic extraction of a depletable 
resource, disposed after the extraction in a market. One of the first model’s crucial 
characteristic is that the extraction cost is dependent not only from the monopolist’s utility but 
also from the remaining stock of the resource. At the solution process, under the closed loop 
informational structure, we found the analytic expression of the optimal monopolistic 
strategy, which also is time consistent and therefore an objective for further research and 
policy instrument, as well.  
In the game theory part of the paper we tackle with a renewable resource model for 
which as the growth function of the resource is set the well known (from biology) Gompertz 
growth function. In the equilibrium analysis that follows, pointing out the closed loop 
solutions of the game, we found the analytic expressions of the cooperative and non 
cooperative strategies. All the above strategies are independent the state’s variable as well as 
the control’s variable, but only hinges upon the discount factor. Therefore, these strategies 
have the important properties of time consistency, thus they constitute economically acceptant 
policies. Regarding the players’ payoffs, we also found the analytic expressions of the value 
functions which are functions of the state variable and functions of  the common discount rate 
as well. 
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